Limitations upon the Remedy of  Strict Tort  Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of Goods--Has the Citadel Been Devastated ? by Crocker, Leslie
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1
1965
Limitations upon the Remedy of "Strict Tort"
Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of Goods--
Has the Citadel Been Devastated ?
Leslie Crocker
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Leslie Crocker, Limitations upon the Remedy of "Strict Tort" Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of Goods--Has the Citadel Been
Devastated ?, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 300 (1965)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol17/iss1/10
[Vol. 17:300
Limitations Upon the Remedy of "Strict Tort"
Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of
Goods-Has the "Citadel" Been Devastated?
S INCE 1960, there has been a revolutionary development in the
area of products liability - the recognition of strict tort liability
as a remedy for the manufacture and sale of defective goods. Tbhs
article will attempt first, to define existing limitations upon the
remedy of strict tort liability by an analysis of recent, leading deci-
sions and second, to discuss whether any limitations should be a-
posed upon the remedy in the future. A brief glance at the history
of products liability is essential to an understanding of this rapidly
changing area.'
I. THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT AND THE FIRST ATTACK
Warranty is a curious hybrid, "born of the illicit intercourse of
tort and contract, unique in the law."' Liability for this most
"notable example of legal miscegenation"' was originally based on
tort with the first case employing the contract theory appearing in
1778.' Thereafter, warranty, express or implied, gradually came
to be regarded as based upon a contract of sale. The proper remedy
was therefore considered to be an action in contract.5
The confusion which now exists in the area of products liability
probably received its greatest impetus in 1842 when Lord Abinger
predicted that there would be "the most absurd and outrageous con-
sequences, to which I can see no limit,"' should a party to a contract
be held liable for its breach to anyone except the other party.' Thus,
the notorious creature, "privity of contract," was born. Under this
1 See, e.g., Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 DUQUESNE L.
REV. 1 (1963); James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. Rxv.
293 (1958); Keeton, Products Liability - Liability without Fault and the Requirement
of a Defect, 41 TExAs L. REV. 855 (1963); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Delec-
tive Products: The Road to and Past Vandermsrk, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 30 (1965);
Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964); Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE LJ. 1099 (1960).
2 PROSSER, TORTS § 95, at 651 (3d ed. 1964)
3 Id. at 651 n.85.
AId. at 651.
5 Ibid.
6 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex.
1842) See Prosser, supra note 1.
7 Prosser, supra note 1, at 1100.
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doctrine a contracting party owed no responsibility to a third per-
son with whom he had made no contract, that is, with whom he
was not in privity. This nineteenth century view, however, failed to
consider the possibility of a duty owed by one party to another aside
from the contract.' The existence of a contract with one party
would not necessarily negative the responsibility of the contracting
party for the injuries of another person. Unfortunately, Lord
Abinger's words were construed to mean that there could be no ac-
tion, in either tort or contract, by one not in privity.'
This general rule, that a contracting party had no liability to
one with whom he was not in privity, continued into the twentieth
century.1" However, even before that time the courts began devel-
oping certain exceptions which diminished the effect of the privity
doctrine. First, if a seller knew a product was dangerous and neg-
lected to inform the buyer of this fact, he could be held liable to a
third person injured by such use."1 Second, a seller was held liable
when a product was used on the seller's premises, the user being
treated as an invitee.'" Finally, the seller was held liable to a third
party for injuries caused by a product "imminently" or "inherently"
dangerous to human life or safety.'8
What was meant by an inherently dangerous product was not
dearly defined until 1916 in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,'4
when Judge Cardozo greatly extended the class of inherently dan-
gerous articles by stating that, "if the nature of a thing is such
that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when
negligently made, it is then a thing of danger."' " While the Mac-
Pherson rule extended only to the ultimate purchaser, the scope of
8 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2, at 658.
9 Ibul,
10 Id. at 658-59.
11 Id. at 659-60.
12 Id. at 660.
13 lbud.
14217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). There a maker of an automobile with a
defective wheel was held liable for negligence to a purchaser who was not in privity of
contract.
1Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. The effect of the MacPherson case was even more
significant. The reasoning behind the opinion made it clear that by placing the car
upon the market, the manufacturer had assumed a responsibility to the consumer which
did not rest upon contract, but upon the relation arising from the purchase and fore-
seeability of harm resulting from lack of proper care. Since the seller s affirmative
conduct may well affect the interests of others, the duty was said to be imposed by law.
See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 661.
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the rule was gradually enlarged to unpose negligence liability upon
a contractual supplier of any chattel.'"
II. THE ADVENT AND EXPANSION OF STRICT LIABILITY
The manufacturer and seller of products having been held li-
able to the ultimate consumer on the basis of negligence, it is not
surprising that an attempt was made to extend their responsibility
even further, to make them strictly liable for injuries caused by
their products, even if they had exercised all reasonable care.
The assault on the "fortress of strict liability"'" began in the
area of food and drink. Early American decisions imposed strict
liability upon the seller of food for injuries arising after a direct
sale to the injured consumer. 8 The ultimate acceptance of strict
liability in this area can be attributed to several comcading factors:
(1) the national concern over defective food and drugs, strength-
ened by the "muckrakers" who exploited certain heinous practices of
the food industry; (2) the liberal "trust-busting" atmosphere of
1912 and the philosophy of protection of the people from big busi-
ness; and (3) perhaps most of all, the natural concern of human
beings with something affecting them so intimately."9
As strict liability was gradually accepted in the area of food and
drink, the rule was gradually extended into other areas. It was first
extended to products intended for external rather than internal iti-
mate bodily use.2" In 1960, Dean Prosser wrote of seven "spec-
tacular decisions, which appear to have thrown the limitation to food
onto the ashpile ,21 These decisions held the seller strictly
liable to the ultimate user for the sale of any dangerous product
even though the seller exercised all possible care, and no con-
tractual relations existed between the seller and the user.22  Since
1960, other decisions, more spectacular perhaps, have not only con-
firmed the discard of the limitation of strict liability to food, but
may soon cause the question to be reversed: is there any exception
to the rule of strict liability? It is to this ultimate question that an
examination of the recent decisions will be addressed.
16 Prosser, supra note 1, at 1100-02.
17Id. at 1103.
IId. at 1104 n.37
19 1d. at 1104-06.
20 It was extended to apply to such products as hair dye, soap and cigarettes. PROssER,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 676-77
21 Prosser, supra note 1, at 1112.
22 bl,.
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A. Spence and Beyond. An Awakening
In 1958, "the real bursting of the dam'  in the area of strict
tort liability began in Michigan with the decision in Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc.' This case held a manu-
facturer of defective cinder blocks strictly liable although his prod-
uct was patently not intended for bodily use, was not inherently dan-
gerous, and caused only property damage. Subsequent cases con-
tinued the trend by imposing strict liability for breach of -warranty
upon a manufacturer of electrical cable,25 a manufacturer of tires; 6
a maker of a grinding wheel,27 a manufacturer of truckS)28 the manu-
facturer of an airplane," and finally a manufacturer of house
trailers.3 °
At first the imposition of strict tort liability was justified on the
nebulous grounds of "public policy."'" Gradually, however, the
courts began to invent theories, generally unsound, to support
opinions applying the strict tort remedy.3 2 The.theory of a "war-
ranty" running with the goods from the manufacturer to the con-
sumer was the most generally accepted.33 However, since warranty
previously had become associated with contract in the thinking of
most courts, the adoption of this theory led to many complications
in imposing strict tort liability.34 Nevertheless, by 1960, some
courts had overcome these complications and had succeeded in ex-
2 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 677.
24 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
25 Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d
40 (Fla. App. 1958). 1 1 ,
26B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cit. 1959).
2 7 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber C., 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. App. 1959), modified, 54
Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
28 Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
29 Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), where the
court relied upon an overruled California opinion. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1113.
30 Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
31 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 678.
•321bd. Some of the theories employed to circumvent a lack of privity between
plaintiff and defendant were: (1) the fictitious agency of the intermediate party to
purchase for the consumer; (2) the theoretical assignment of the seller's warranty to the
immediate buyer, and (3) the third party beneficiary contract.
3 3 This theory was first enunciated in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss.
876, 111 So. 305 (1927). See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 678.
34 Two such problems involve the giving of notice of breach of a warranty by the
buyer to the seller and the possibility of disclaimer of warranties by the seller, both dealt
with in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code. See Shanker, Strict
Tort Theory of Products Lbability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary
on Jurisprudentia Eclipses, Pigeonholes, and Communication Barriers, 17 W Ras. L.
REV. 5 (1965).
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tending strict liability for breach of warranty on non-consumer,
commercial products even though only property damage, and not
personal injury, was involved.
Several of the cases can easily be criticized in terms of logic
and their analysis of prior law; 5 but as an aggregate, they represent
a breakthrough in the assault on the concepts of contract and privity
in the area of products liability. These decisions, "spectacular" in
1960, were but the beginning of the emergence of a general rule of
strict tort liability.
B. ,The Acceptance of Strict Tort Liability
(1) New York.-Post-1960 New York decisions provide
an illustration of the tortuous evolution some courts have
traversed in making the transition,, under our system of case-by-case
adjudication, from privity and the contract theory of warranty to
strict tort liability. In 1961, a New York court in Greenberg v.
Lorenz " was confronted with a less than sensational fact situa-
tion. A child was injured when she bit into a piece of metal in
some salmon purchased by her father. In imposing liability upon
the retail food dealer, despite the lack of privity between the child
and thedealer, the court carefully justified its decision in favor of
the child, as well as the father, by reasoning that it would be mani-
fesdy unjust to deny a child damages because of non-privity. The
court added that since the privity rule is itself of judicial making,
'so convincing a showing of injustice and unpracticality calls upon
us to move; but we should be cautious and take one step at a tnme.""
The fact that the child's father, and not the child herself, purchased
the food, the court continued, is not sufficient reason to dismiss her
cause of action, particularly since today much food is sold in pack-
ages and goes beyond the individual buyer. Therefore, the court
concluded, "at least as to food and household goods, the presump-
tion should be that the purchase was made for all the members of
the household.""8
Thus in 1961, the "liberal" New York courts, while exhibiting
a tendency towards expansion of strict tort liability, were proceed-
ing cautiously indeed. Strict liability could be imposed as to "food
and household goods," a result previously reached and surpassed
85 See, e.g., Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 126 A.2d 568 (1959)
369 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961)
37 Id. at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 775-76, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
38Id. at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
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elsewhere. 9 The reluctance to open the remedy of strict liability
to a broad interpretation is emphasized by the concurring opinion in
the Greenberg case,4 in which the necessity of privity as a general
rule was emphasized. The concurring opinion viewed this particu-
lar case as an exception to the privity rule and maintained that the
rule itself should be changed only by the legislature.
In Randy Knitwear, Inc. v American Cyanamid Co.,41 New
York advanced one step further. There, a remote purchaser brought
an action for damage resulting from fabric shrinkage against a resin
manufacturer and its licensees. The plaintiff had contracted for cer-
tain textile material which had been expressly warranted against
shrinkage by the manufacturer of the resins with which the damaged
material was treated. The court granted recovery, extending the
Greenberg rationale to encompass modern merchandising and com-
mercial practices - mass media advertising and representations on
packages and labels. Recognizing that some courts had distin-
guished between injury to the person and injury to property, the
court nevertheless rejected any such distinction by stating that "since
the basis of liability turns not upon the character of the product but
upon the representation, there is no justification for a distinction
on the basis of the type of injury suffered or the type of article or
goods involved."4 The language of the opinion, and, particularly the
dictum therein, was broad, with the court concluding that the "old
court-made rule" should be modified to dispense with the privity. re-
quirement.4" Although the majority viewed this conclusion as no
more than a fulfillment of "an historic and necessary function of the
court"44 to make the law harmonious with "modern-day needs and
with concepts of justice and fair dealing, '45 a concurring opinion
refused to dispense with the requirement of privity without limita-
tion, caustically remarking that "we decide cases as they arise
* *,,41 Thus, a reluctance to extend the strict tort remedy without
limit was still discernible.
In 1963, the New York Court of Appeals issued its spectacular
89 See PRossER, op. ct. supra note 2, at 674-78.
409 N.Y.2d 195, 198, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43 (1961)
4 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
42 Id. at 15, 181 N.E.2d at 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
43 Ibsd.
44 1bu.
45 Ibld.
461d. at 16, 181 N.E.2d at 405, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
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decision in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.4 7  An admins-
tratrix sued for damages for the death of her daughter, a fare-paying
passenger, in a plane crash. The court held 4 to 3 that an airplane
manufacturer's unplied warranty of fitness of his product for its
contemplated use runs in favor of all intended users, despite a lack
of privity of contract. More significantly, the court made dear that
a breach of warranty is not only a violation of the sales contract out
of which the warranty arises, "but is a tortious wrong suable by a
noncontracting party whose use of the warranted article is within the
reasonable contemplation of the vendor or .manufacturer."'4
Although Greenberg,49 Randy Knitwear,° and other decisions"
prepared the way for this extension, they did not unambiguously
recognize breach of warranty as a etortious wrong" warranting the
application of strict tort liability. The new outright recognition of
strict tort in Goldberg was limited only to the extent that the man-
ufacturer of a component part of the finished product was not held
liable - at least for the present." It was felt that holding the air-
plane manufacturer liable would provide adequate protection for
passengers.53
(2) Califorma.-The adoption of strict tort liability in Califor-
nia preceded the acceptance of that doctrine in New York. In
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,. an action was brought in
negligence and express warranty against the manufacturer and
seller of 'a defective home workshop machine which caused injury
to the plaintiff.' The plaintiff failed to notify the manufacturer of
the breach of the express warranty as required by the Uniform
Sales-Act.5' After distinguishing between the Sales Act warranties
and the rules applicable in an action for personal injuries resulting
from a defective product, the California Supreme Court held that
the notice req4uirements of the Sales Act were inapplicable in an ac-
tion against a manufacturer with whom the injured party had never
47 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
48Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594. (Emphasis added.)
499 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961)
50 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
51 See discussion of the California cases, in the text accompanying notes 54-65 infra.
52 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 435, 191 N.E.2d 81,
83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (1963) The obvious implication is that the manufacturer
of a component part will be held liable in the future.
53 Ibid.
54 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rep. 697 (1962).
55 UiFo M SALEs AcT §§ 49, 69.
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dealt. The court further distinguished strict tort liability from
breach of warranty by stating:
[T]o impose strict liability on the manufacturer under the circum-
stances of this case, it was not necessary for plaintiff to establish
an express warranty. A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being. The abandonment of the re-
quirement of a contract between them [the manufacturer and the
plaintiff], the recognition that the liability is not assumed by
agreement but imposed by law and the refusal to permit the
manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for de-
fective products make dear that the liability is not one gov-
erned by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict
liability in tort.56
This unequivocal recognition of the doctrine of strict liability in
California was not as surprising as it might have been elsewhere since
in the 1944 decision of Escola v Coca Cola Bottling Co.,57 Judge
Traynor, who wrote the opinion in the Greenman case, had written
a landmark concurring opinion, in which he advocated holding a
manufacturer strictly liable for njuries resulting from defective ar-
ticles which the manufacturer placed in the stream of commerce."
He reasoned then that the imposition of strict tort liability was jus-
tified by considerations of public policy as well as by the fact that
the manufacturer was in a better position to bear any risk involved.
Almost two decades later, in Greenman, his view became the law
of California.
Most of the questions left unanswered in Greenman were dis-
posed of two years later in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. 9 Vander-
mark made dear that the requirement of timely notice was inap-
plicable to tort liability and that the dealer's attempted disclaimer of
liability was ineffectual, since he was held strictly liable in tort, thus
56 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal. Rep. 697, 700-01 (1962).
57 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
58Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440. Interestingly, Judge Traynor actually used the words
"absolute liability" and not "strict liability" in his opinion in Escola. Since he indicated
that the product must have a defect, however, he obviously intended what is generally
referred to now as "strict' liability. See discussion in text accompanying notes 109-13
infra. However, he used the term "strict liability" in Greenman.
59 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rep. 896 (1964) Vandermark was not
without precedent, since a similar conclusion was reached in a similar fact situation in
the famous Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Hennngsen was decided under the Uniform Sales Act, but the court utilized the Uni-
form Commeraial Code concept of unconscionability. See Shanker, supra note 34, at 29.
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rendering contractual restriction of liability immaterial."° Also,
Greenman was extended to retailers "engaged in the business of dis-
tributing goods to the public," on the theory that retailers are an "in-
tegral part" of the "overall marketing enterprise," and should share
with manufacturers the cost of injuries resulting from defective
products.6 The court also noted that holding the retailer strictly
liable should contribute to safety and afford maximum protection to
injured parties. The court justified its conclusion by reasoning that
the retailer and manufacturer may adjust costs in their commercial
dealings." The court rejected defendant manufacturer's conten-
tion that it should not be held liable unless plaintiff proved that
no part of the automobile had been changed during the interval
between its departure from Ford's control and the ultimate sale to
the plaintiff. In indicating that strict liability encompasses defects
"regardless of their source," the court stressed that the fact that a
defective part is supplied by another or connected with others in
the chain of distribution will not obviate the manufacturer's liabil-
ity for the completed product. 3 Thus, with the Vandermark deci-
sion, California rejected the contractual and negligence concepts sur-
rounding warranty, choosing to embrace strict tort liability with its
necessary concomitants.
Interestingly, a later 1964 California case, Seely v. White Motor
Co.," refused to impose strict liability for property damage, finding
that an analysis of the Greenman and Vandermark cases precluded
such a result. The court emphasized the numerous references in
these decisions to personal injury and stated that at this tume the
doctrine of strict liability in California is limited to that type of in-
jury.65
60 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rep. 896
(1964) The court stated its position concerning the dealer s disclaimer: "regardless
of the obligations it assumed by contract, it is subject to strict liability in tort because
it is in the business of selling automobiles, one of which proved to be defective and
caused injury to human beings." Id. at 263, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rep. at 900.
61 Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rep. at 899.
62 Id. at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rep. at 899-900. The concept of pub-
lic policy enunciated by Judge Traynor in Vandermark extends further than that origi-
nally advocated by him in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150
P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion). There he advanced similar reasons for
holding a manufacturer strictly liable, without mention of retailers.
63 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 261, 391 P.2d 168, 170-71, 37
Cal. Rep. 896, 898-99 (1964). See Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Pro-
ducts: The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 SO. CAL. L. REv. 30, 45 (1965).
64 39 Cal. Rep. 805 (Ct. App. 1964), aff'd, 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rep. 17 (1965).
65 Id. at 811. The Seely court was not alone in its reluctance to impose strict lia-
bility upon a manufacturer when injury to property alone is alleged. Ibid. In Atlas
[Vol. 17:300
STRICT TORT LIABILITY
(3) Other iurisdicttons.-Two recent cases6" illustrate the cur-
rent trend toward the adoption of strict tort liability in other juris-
dictions. In Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co.,67 a federal court apply-
ing Texas substantive law held both the manufacturer of a fork
stem connecting a wheel to a wheelchair and the assembler of the
wheelchair strictly liable to the plaintiff who rented the chair from
a retail druggist - the purchaser - and who was injured when a
wheel came off because of a defect in the fork system. In finding
liability, the court stated that this product, if defective, was as un-
reasonably dangerous to the user as harmful food products. It
reached this conclusion even though (1) the product was not for
human consumption, (2) there was no proof of negligence, and
(3) there was no privity between the user and manufacturer or as-
sembler. Citing several of the cases previously discussed, as well as
Texas case law, the court pointed out that the prwity requirement in
Texas had been greatly relaxed, and that public policy necessitated
the imposition of liability through operation of law upon the party
who placed an unreasonably dangerous product in the stream of
commerce. The court concluded by emphasizing that the imposi-
tion of strict liability was appropriate "as to any product that has a
defect unreasonably dangerous enough to cause harm to its user.
v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1964), a subpurchaser of an ad-
hesive claimed that the product failed to hold glass in his window frames, requiring
him to reglaze thousands of window panes at great expense. The Pennsylvania federal
court refused to grant recovery for breach of warranty in the absence of privity between
plaintiff and defendant, claiming that the defense of privity had not been vanquished
in Pennsylvania law when the cause of action is based upon an implied warranty and
when the "damages sustained are solely property damages or commercial losses without
personal injury." Id. at 55.
In stating that the rule of privity was not defunct in Pennsylvama, the court referred
to Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court demed recovery to an employee who had been injured by
an exploding bottle, since he was "a complete stranger to any contract transaction in-
volved" and did not fall within the express statutory exceptions of § 2-318 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (enacted in Pennsylvania). Id. at 614, 187 A.2d at 578. "To
grant such an extension of the warranty, as urged herein, would in effect render the
manufacturer a guarantor of his product and impose liability on all such accident cases
even if the utmost degree of care were exercised. This would lead to harsh and un-just results." Ibfd. It should be noted, however, that the impact of the Hochgertel
case has been mitgated by Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463
(1964), noted in 14 CATrrouc U.L REv. 133 (1965), which extended a sellers im-
plied warranty to include an employee of the purchaser. In Yentzer, the employee
made the purchase himself, whereas in Hochgertel the employer was the buyer. Thus,
while the Hochgertel decision was officially reaffirmed, its effect was avoided by a seem-
ingly meamngless distinction.66 Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Lonzrick v. Republic
Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92, motion to certify granted, 38 OHIO
BAR 700 (June 23, 1965) (No. 39493).
67 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cit. 1964).
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Man does not live by bread alone."" Whether the Putman court
intended its decision to encompass both personal injury and prop-
erty damage is not entirely clear, but it is clear that the court would
impose strict liability regardless of the type of product involved.
However, despite the many broad statements in the opinion, it
should be emphasized that the nature of the product, a wheelchair,
was such as to make the holding predictable and reasonable, and the
court itself stressed this factor.69
In the second recent case, Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.,7"
the product involved was "steel bar joists" - a commercial, rather
than a consumer, product. The plaintiff was a construction worker
employed by a sub-contractor. The joists were purchased from the
defendant by the general contractor. Although the plaintiff could in
no way be considered a consumer, the court held the manufacturer
liable in an action for personal injuries based on a breach of the duty
mposed by law to furnish merchantable joists to the general con-
tractor. The court also' found an obvious lack of prilvity irrelevant
since the remedy sought was strict tort liability. Relying upon
Greenman," Randy Knitwear,7" Vandermark,73 other recent de-
cisions, and public policy, the court concluded that the manufac-
turer's obligation to market a merchantable product is created by
law and "has no dependence whatever on the contractual relations
between the parties." 4
The Lonzrick court indicated three methods by which one suf-
fering injury or damage due to a defective chattel delivered by
the manufacturer or vendor might seek redress against the manu-
facturer. First, where the ultimate purchaser stands in a con-
tractual relation to the producer or vendor, an action (if justi-
fied by the facts) for breach of express or implied warranty may be
681d. at 923. The court also discussed various drafts of section 402 A of the RE-
STATEMENT (SncoiN), TORTs (1965) in detail, which will be discussed ifra.
69 Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 915 (5th Cir. 1964).
70 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92, motion to certify granted, 38 OmIo BAR
700 (June 23, 1965) (No. 39493).
7 1 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rep.
697 (1962).
72 Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399,
226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
7 3 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rep. 896
(1964).
74 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 377, 205 NE.2d 92, 95,
motion to certify granted, 38 OHio BAR 700 (June 23, 1965) (No. 39493).
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maintained as provided by the Uniform Commercial Code. 5 Second,
an action may be brought for negligence, as in the MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.76 case, regardless of prvity.7" Third, an action
may be brought to enforce strict tort liability without privity."8 The
court appears to suggest that these remedies are available alterna-
tively, depending on the particular fact situation, provided only that
the theory advanced by plaintiff is dearly and correctly pleaded.
The court also indicated that since "warranty" in actuality means no
more than a representation by the manufacturer that his goods are
of merchantable quality (an obligation imposed by law which de-
scribes a cause of action for strict liability), the manufacturer may
not define the scope of his own responsibility for defective products,
since the liability is not one governed by the law of contract war-
ranties, but by the law of strict liability in tort.7"
(4) Restatement Second, Torts.-The ascendancy of the strict
tort doctrine in the area of products liability has received a definite
impetus from the Restatement of Torts, Second." In contrast to
the original Restatement, which contained no provision for strict
liability based on a seller's warranty, the 1961 draft of section 402 A
provided for the seller's strict liability, but limited it to claims for
"food for human consumption.""' One year later, the next tenta-
tive draft 2 expanded coverage to include "products intended for in-
timate bodily use," whether or not they have any nutritional value.8"
Finally, in May, 1964, the last tentative draft of section 402A84 ex-
tended coverage to include all products.8 5 The only limitation m-
75 Id. at 383, 205 NE.2d at 98. It would appear that this view severely limits the
role of the Uniform Commercial Code to those in privity of contract and the accuracy
of this view is indeed questionable. For a discussion of the relationship of the Uniform
Commercial Code to developing case law, see Shanker, supra note 34.
76217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
7 7 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 383, 205 N.E.2d 92, 98,
motion to certify granted, 38 OnIo BAR 700 (June 23, 1965) (No. 39493).
78 Ibid.
7 9 Ibd.
80 Tls Draft has been relied upon increasingly in the most recent decisions. See,
e.g., Putmian v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964), where the court
analyzed the evolution of the various drafts of § 402 A from the original REsTATEmNT
to the last tentative draft in May, 1964.
8 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs § 402 A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
82 REsTATmENT (SECOND), TORTs § 402 A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
83 Ibui.
s4 RESTATEmENT (SECOND), ToRTs § 402 A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) (now
official version).
85 § 402 A Special Liability of Seller of Product to User or Consuaer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability for
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posed therein is that the product must be defective and unreasonably
dangerous at the tme of sale. There is no limitation upon the type
of product involved, nor upon the type of harm inflicted, since sec-
tion 402A explicitly includes the terms "any product" and "physical
harm" to the user or consumer "or to his property."8
III. EXISTING LIMITATIONS ON STRICT TORT LIABILITY
While some courts still hesitate to impose strict tort liability
upon manufacturers and sellers other than in the area of food pro-
ducts,87 it is now apparent that those which recognize the remedy
are beginning to apply it with few restrictions. Not one of the
recent cases discussed refused to impose strict liability because
of the type of product involved. On the other hand, there has been
some reluctance to impose liability when only injury to property,
and not to person, has been incurred. For example, in Greenman v
Yuba Power Prods., Inc." and Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,s"
the courts repeatedly referred to strict liability in terms of defects
which cause personal injury to human beings.9" The court in Seeley
v. White Motor Co.9 borrowed the same language in justifying its
conclusion that strict liability, in California, could be imposed only
in the case of personal injuries. A federal court applying Pennsyl-
vania law92 echoed this conclusion, drawing a pointed distinction be-
tween damages sustained to property and personal injury It is true,
however, that several courts have unequivocally denounced any such
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
86 Ibid.
ST See, e.g., Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D.
Pa. 1964); Seely v. White Motor Co., 39 Cal. Rep. 805 (Ct. App. 1964), aff'd, 63
Cal. 2d 1,403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rep. 17 (1965)
s 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rep. 697 (1962)
89 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rep. 896 (1964)
90 See discussion in text accompanying notes 54-63 supra.
9139 Cal. Rep. 805 (Ct. App. 1964), afJ'd, 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rep. 17 (1965).
92Atas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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distinction." In Randy Knitwear Inc. v. Amertcan Cyanamul Co. 4
although the injury involved fabric shrinkage resulting in material
loss, and not personal harm, the court rejected any distinction
either on the basis of the type of injury suffered or the type of pro-
duct involved, stating that the liability of the manufacturer turns
upon the representation alone. 5
If some reluctance still exists to impose liability where property
damage alone has been incurred, it is reasonable to predict that this
limitation will also fall by the wayside in the continuing "assault"
upon the fortress of strict liability. Authorities in the field of
torts9 6 reject any distinction between injury to property and injury
to person," and the Restatement of Torts, Second imposes strict li-
ability for the manufacture of any product which causes injury to
the person and to property. These two forces will undoubtedly
prove influential in the future. Furthermore, the language in re-
cent leading opinions that seems to limit liability to injury to human
beings" is easily subject to a different interpretation. It is logical
to believe that such language was employed merely because personal
injury constituted the only daim then before the court. In the not
too distant future, then, strict liability without limitation may be
expected as the law of the land.
IV. SHOULD ANY LIMITATIONS BE IMPOSED?
It is now apparent that strict liability without limitation may
be expected in every jurisdiction. One question remains: are there
93 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958); Randy Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super.
422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
94 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 NE.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
9rId. at 9, 181 N.E.2d at 404, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 368. This case did involve an ex-
press warranty and the court emphasized the representations made by the defendant
through advertisements.
96 See, e.g., Jaeger, Privty of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? I DuQUESNE L.
REv. 1 (1963); James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, 18 LA. L. REV.
293 (1958); Keeton, Products Liability - Liability without Fault and the Requirement
of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 855 (1963); Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defec-
tive Products: The Road to and Past Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L REv. 30 (1965);
Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964); Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
97These same authors have already rejected any distinction between the types of
products involved. See note 96 supra.
98 See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rep. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rep. 697 (1962). In both these cases, the claims before the court involved
personal injury alone.
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any valid reasons for imposing any limitations upon strict tort li-
ability? An examination of the policy considerations underlying
the imposition of this remedy is essential in constructing an answer.
Of the many arguments advanced in support of strict liability,
it has been pointed out that the courts have generally accepted or
relied on only three." First, public interest in the protection of
human life and safety necessitates a maximum degree of protection
against dangerous products which consumers must buy and against
which they are unable to protect themselves. Such helplessness
justifies the unposition of responsibility on the suppliers of the
products for harm incurred, even if all possible care has been exer-
cised."1° Second, since the manufacturer places his products on the
market and represents to the public that they are safe for use, often
attempting to encourage such belief by packaging and advertising,
he must expect his product to be purchased and used in reliance
upon his. representations; therefore, he should not be allowed to
avoid or limit his responsibility.'' Third, the ultimate result of
strict liability has already been attainable by a series of actions.0 2
that are time-consuming and expensive and may be halted by insol-
vency, or lack of jurisdiction.' For these practical reasons, then,
strict liability in tort should be recognized unequivocally.
Clearly, the last two arguments apply equally to any product or
injury. While the public interest in human protection is not as rele-
vant to products not intended for bodily use, it is nevertheless true that
the suppliers of all products are in a position to insure maximum
protection to ultimate users, regardless of the nature of the pro-
duct, and therefore should bear this responsibility. It is still tempt-
ing, however, to offer a distinction between commercial and con-
sumer goods. The line between the two types of products is some-
times close and problems of definition would be a likely result.
99 Prosser, supra note 96, at 1119-22.
100 Id. at 1122. Prosser comments that this argument rests essentially upon "public
sentiment" and had greatest impact in the area of food, where public indignation has
been most apparent. It is, however, now being advanced as to other products, such as
automobiles. Ibtd.
'O01d. at 1123. Further, the middleman is "no more than a conduit, a mere me-
chanical device," through whom the product sold reaches the eventual user. Since the
supplier has sought use of his product, he cannot avoid responsibility if its use results
in harm by saying that he has no contract with the user. Ibid.
102 Although the retailer is first held liable on a warranty to the purchaser, indem-
nity is usually sought from other suppliers, with the manufacturer ultimately paying the
damages plus the cost of repeated litigation. lbud.
103Id at 1124.
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One answer, however, may be an agreement among the commercial
parties defining terms satisfactory to all."0 " But there are positive
reasons to make such a distinction: to encourage manufacturers to
experiment in new commercial products and to allow others to as-
sume the risk of such experimentation.
In arguing against distinguishing between types of injuries in-
curred, it has been said that a tort is a tort, regardless of the type
of injury that results, and that it would be manifestly unjust to grant
relief for a minor personal injury while denying it for a major in-
jury to property, each ensuing from the same tort. 5 It has also
been said that such arguments perhaps overlook one factor: that
the doctrine imposing strict tort liability upon the manufacturer and
seller of goods rests primarily on social and economic policy - the
wish to allocate certain basic risks to those best able to bear them. 06
Tis policy might be less persuasive when considered in relation to
property damage rather than to personal injury. This latter "reason-
ing" is unpersuasive.
No satisfactory rationale has been presented for distinguishing
between the two types of injury, although some courts have exerted
much mental effort in attempting to do so. 0 When strict liability
was limited to products intended for bodily use, recovery was neces-
sarily restricted to personal injury alone. With the application of
strict liability without regard to the type of product involved and the
fact that some products are more likely to cause property damage
104 Such agreements must be drawn with care, avoid any unconscionability and
conform with all terms in the applicable commercial code. See discussion on the Uni-
form Commercial Code in Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Lability and the Unt--
form Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclpses, Pigeonholes, and
Communcatt#o Barrwrs, 17 W RIs. L. REv. 5 (1965).
1051 ascher, supra note 96, at 58-59.
1 0 6 In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (concurring opinion), Judge Traynor stated:
In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an
absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect which causes
injury to human beings. Even if there is no negligence, however, public
policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards
and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who
suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its conse-
quences
107 See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 39 Cal. Rep. 805 (Ct. App. 1964), aff'd,
63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rep. 17 (1965).
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than personal injury, there is no logical reason for distinguishing
between the types of injury incurred.'
Once strict liability is accepted as the law of the land, as there
is every indication that it will be in the not too distant future, it
will be applied without limitation to specific dasses of products or
injuries. Any reluctance present in the courts at this tune will be
overcome, as the doctrine of strict liability is carried to its logical
conclusion.
V THE MANUFACTURE AND SELLER - WHAT REMAINS?
Once strict liability without limitation is accepted as the law
of the land, manufacturers and sellers will undoubtedly bemoan
their fate. They will doubtless construe this new remedy to inply
liability regardless of what positive actions they may take, and fear
that no defenses remain to them. This is not true. Strict liability
is not an absolute liability. 9 In strict liability, it is essential to show
that the product is defective. In other words, mere suffering of in-
jury from a product, whether defective or not, is not sufficient to
gain access to this remedy. In contrast, the "absolute liability" ap-
plied to users of such things as explosives permits recovery from the
user for injuries even though the product is totally non-defective."'
There are also certain defenses to strict liability. The Restate-
ment of Torts, Second recognizes assumption of the risk as a de-
fense."' A recent case, Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co.,112 recognizes
"misuse" as a defense, stating that although contributory negligence
is not a defense to strict tort liability, "use different from or more
strenuous than that contemplated to be safe by ordinary users/con-
sumers, that is, "misuse," would either refute a defective condition
or causation,""' 3 both of which are essential to recovery. Misuse
would often include conduct that might be considered contributory
negligence, the court explained, adding that assumption of the risk,
108 Thus the RnSTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 402 A (1965), which imposes
strict liability regardless of the type of product involved, logically extends recovery to
both personal and property damages.
109 See Lascher, supra note 96, at 47
11 lIbu.
111 RETATEmENT (SEcOND), TORTs § 402 A, comment t; (1965)
112 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965)
"13 Id. at 429.
[VOL 17,300
1965] STRICT TORT LIABILITY 317
as made dear in the Restatement, was also a good defense. Thus,
there can be no doubt that assumption of the risk will be a valid de-
fense, and that m all probability other courts will follow the Greeno
court m recognizing "misuse" as well.
IV CONCLUSION
The revolutionary development of strict tort liability as a remedy
for the manufacture and sale of defective goods has swept our land.
The limitations presently m existence upon this remedy are few
and in all probability these too will be discarded as the rush toward
strict tort liability continues.
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